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IN THE SUPREMF. cnuRT nF 'l'.'HE S'r.~TE OF' tJTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
WENDELL IRVI nr, HI r ... L, 
T>efendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPOTIDENT 
Case No. lRlAO 
STATEMENT OF THE N.~'rTlPE OF THF. CASE 
Appellant was chargen with one count of Agqravated 
Burglary in violation of Utah Code Ann., ~ 76-6-2n3 ( 1978), 
one count of Aggravated Robbery in violation of Utah Code 
Ann.,~ 76-~-302 (lq7R), one count of Theft in violation of 
Utah Code Ann., ~ 76-~-404 (19~8), one count of Aggravaten 
Assault in violation of Utah Code Ann., ~ 76-5-103 ( 1978), and 
a secona count of Aggravated Assault which was dismissed prior 
to the trial. 
nISP()S!TIOl'1 IN TflF, LOW:RR COTTRT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and was found 
guilty of one count each of Aggravatea Burglary, Agqravated 
Robbery, ~heft, and Aggravated Assault on December 2 and 3, 
1981 in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of TJtah, the Honorable Christine M. nurham 
presiding. on December l~, 1~81, the trial court sentenced 
appellant to two indeterminate terMs of not less than five 
years which may be for life, one indeterminate term of not 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
less than one year nor more than fifteen years and one 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years, the sentences to 
run concurrently. 
RELIEF SOTJf;PT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks a judgment and order of this Court 
affirming the jury verdict and sentence of the lower court. 
STATEMF,NT OF FAC!'S 
Late in the evening of nctober ;, lq81, or the early 
morning of October 8, 19Rl, Richard Salamone, manager of the 
Stratford Hotel, and John Savage, his guest, were watching 
. television in the office of Salarnone's apartment in the hotel 
(T. 41, 4~). Salamone's living quarters were in noom 2n~ of 
the Stratford Rotel, connected to the anjoining manager's 
office in Room 201 by an open doorway (T. 18, 40). Both of 
the adjoining rooms had doors that opened to the hotel's 
hallway (T. 41). 
As Mr. Salamone went into the kitchen in Room 202 to 
get a piece of pie, there was a knock on or shaking of the 
door to Room 201 ( T. 41, 47, 108). Mr. Salamone opened the 
door to Room 202 and saw two rnen--appellant, Wendell Irving 
Hill, and Paul Miller (T. 44). Appellant and Miller forced 
their way into the apartment and appellant struck Mr. Salamone 
(T. 45, 46, 64, 9;, lnQ). Appellant threatened Mr. Salamone 
and Mr. Savage with a "r~rman Ruger" and told Mr. Salamone 
that he was going to kill him (~. 47, ~l, 5S, 6~, R9-90, 
I 99-lOf'). 
-2-
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Appellant asken Mr. Ralamone where the hotel's money 
was kept CT. 4q). Mr. Salamone pointed to the aesk in Room 
201 (T. 4Q). Appellant and Miller took about ~SO from the 
drawer of the desk (T. 50-Sl, 8~, 101). Later, appellant went 
through the drawer again ana found more Monev, approximately 
$20, which he took (T. 56). ~he two men also took a portable 
color- ... television, a clock radio, a short-wave raaio, a 
cassette recorder and a pillowcase from Mr. Ralamone's 
apartment (T. 59-~0). 
nuring the incident, Miller bouna Mr. Salamone ana 
Mr. Savage with nylon stockinqs and gag gen them \Ti th washrags 
(T. 54-55, R5, 101). Appellant repeatenly threatened to kill 
Mr. Salamone and Mr. Savaqe (T. 51, 55-5~, 9q, 104, 10"7). 
Appellant and Miller fled the scene in a Cadillac, 
but were apprehended approximately two and one-half blocks to 
three blocks from the Stratford Hotel (T. ~;, fi?., 104, 113, 
117). The stolen television set was found in the front seat 
of the Cadillac and the other items taken from Mr. Salamone's 
apartment were found in the trunk of the car (T. 62, llq, 
137-130). Seventeen dollars in one-dollar bills was founa 
scatterea in the trunk of the car (T. 140, 147). The gun with 
which appellant threatened Mr. Salamone and Mr. Savage fell 
out of the car onto the street when one of the apprehending 
officers opened the door to the front passenger seat of the 
car where appellant was sitting (T. 119-12P, 123, 14~-147). 
-3-
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Appellant was charqed with Aggravated Burglary, 
Aggravated Robbery, Theft and two counts of Aggravated Assault 
( T. 13-14) • 
At trial, appellant successfully argued that an 
Aggravated Assault charge relating to Mr. Salamone should be 
dismissed because that crime was a lesser included offense of 
the crime of Aggravatea Robbery of Mr. SalaMone, as alleged in 
Count II of the Information. 
Appellant al so contend ea that because Theft, chargea 
in Count III of the Information, was a lesser included offense 
of Aggravated Robbery, charged in Count II of the Information, 
Count III of the Information should be dismissed. The court 
denied appellant's motion and founn that the offenses of Theft 
and Aggravated Robbery, as charqed in the Information, were 
separate offenses ( T. 1Cl9). 
On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court 
erren in failing to find as a matter of law that theft is a 
lesser included offense of aggravatea robbery. Appellant does 
not challenge his convictions on other counts. 
ARGTJMRNT 
POINT I 
THEFT IS NOT A. LESSB:R INCLTTnFn OFFENSF. OF 
A<'~r.RAVATEn ROB RP.RY. 
The question presented in this appeal is whether the 
crime of theft is a lesser included offense of the crime of 
-4-
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aggravated robbery. The standard for determining when an 
offense is a lesser includeo offense of another is codifie~ in 
Utah Code Ann., ~ 76-1-402(3) (195~), as amended, which 
provides: 
(3) A nefendant may be convicted of an 
offense inclu~ea in the offense charged 
but may not be convicted of both the 
offense charged and the included offense. 
An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same 
or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense 
charged: or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, 
solicitation, conspiracy, or forM of 
preparation to commit the offense cha_rged 
or an offense otherwise included therein; 
or 
(c) It is specifically designated by 
statute as a lesser included offense. 
In State v. Brennan, 13 ntah 2d lqs, 371 P. 2d 27, 2~ ( lqn2) 
this Court set forth the requirements of an included offense 
as follows: 
The rule as to when one offense is 
included in another is that the greater 
offense includes a lesser one when 
establishment of the greater would 
necessarily include proof of all the 
elements necesary to prove the lesser. 
Conversely, it is only when proof of the 
lesser offense requires some element not 
involven in the greater offense that the 
lesser would not be an included offense 
[Footnote omittedl. 
See also: State v. Cross, Utah, 64~ P.2d i2 (lC\~2); State v. 
Elliott, TJtah, fi41 P.2a 12?. (l<l8?.): State v. Williams, Utah, 
-~-
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f'16 P.2d 1092 (19Bl); State v. Laine, Utah, 61R P.2d :n 
(1980); State v. r,andee, Utah, 587 P.2d 10~4 (1978); State v. 
Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 13 P.::>.d fi40 ( 1934). The determination of 
whether the lesser offense of theft is included within the 
offense of aggravated robbery requires an examination of the 
respective elements of those offenses. 
The jury was instructed that the statutory elements 
of aggravaten robbery, Utah Code Ann.,~ 76-~-30?. (1951), as 
amenaea, were: 
INSTRUC'l"J:ON NO. lR ( T. 7Q) 
The defendant is chargerl by r.ount II of 
the Information in this case with a 
violation of the statute which provides, 
in part pertinent to this case, as 
follows: 
" ••• a person commits Aggravated Robbery 
if in the course of committing robbery, he 
••• uses a firearm or facsiMile of a 
firearm ••• or a deaaly weapon ••• " 
* * * 
" •• for the purpose of this Part, an 
act shall be deemed to be in the course of 
committing a robbery if it occurs in an 
attempt to coMmit, during the commission 
of, or the immediate flight after the 
at tempt or commission of a robberv" 
(Emphasis added). -· 
See also: Jury Instruction No. ~l (T. 92). The jury was 
instructed that the statutory elements of robbery, Utah Code 
Ann.,~ 7~-fi-301 (1~53), as amended, were: 
INSTRUCTION Nf'. 20 ( T. Al) 
The elements of Robbery, as they relate to 
this case, are; 
-6-
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1. The taking of personal property from 
another person; and · 
2. The possession or immediate presence 
of such other person of said property; and 
3. The taking of such property against 
the will of such other person; and 
4. The accomplishment of such taking by 
such means of force and fear; and 
5. Such taking being then and there 
unlawful; 
~. Such taking beinq then and there 
intentioned. · 
See also: Jury In$truction No. lq (T. Rn). The jury was 
instructen that the statutory eleJT1ents of theft, Utah Code 
Ann., ~ 76-6-404 (lqS3), as amended, were: 
INSTRUCTION !'10. 23 (~. 84) 
The defendant is charged hy Count III of 
the Information in this case with a 
violation of a statute which provides, in 
part pertinent to this case, as follows: 
"A person commits theft if he ohtains or 
exercises unlawful control over the 
property of another with the purpose to 
deprive him thereof" (Emphasis added). 
See also: Jury Instruction No. 3? (T. 93). Jury Instruction 
No. 25 (T. 86) defined "purpose to deprive": 
. . . 
The same statute defines "purpose to 
deprive" to mean ••• "to have the 
conscious obiect: [eitherl to withhold 
property per~anently or for so extended a 
period • • • that a substantial portion of 
its economic value, or of the use ana 
benefit thereof, would be lost; or to 
dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that 
the owner will recover it" [Brackets in 
original; emphasis added]. 
-7-
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The elements requirea for proof of aggravated 
robbery that are not requirea for proof of theft are, first, 
that the person was "in the course of committing robbery," 
s 76-6-302(l)(a): and second, that the taking is accomplishen 
by means of force or fear, ~ 76-6-301(1). 
The elements required for proof of theft that are 
not r~quiren for proof of aggravated robbery are less easily 
ascertained at first qlance. Although confusing, the 
transcript does provide some insight into the trial court's 
basis for holding that theft requires an eleMent additional to 
those that are required for aggravated robbery. The State's 
position at trial was that the element of "obtain[ing] ••• 
control ••• with the purpose to deprive" (~ 7~-6-404) was an 
essential element of theft, State v. Laine, supra, at 15Q, 
but not an essential element of aggravated robbery, Rtate In 
the Interest of R.G.R., TJtah, 597 P.2d 1333, 1335 (197'l). The 
trial court recognizen that the additional ele~ent in theft 
that is not an element of aggravateo robbery is the obtaining 
control with the purpose to deprive (T. ?.6, ?.9, 192). 
The "purpose to deprive" required by the theft 
statute is a more specific kind of intent which goes beyond 
that required for aggravated robbery. An "intentional taking" 
is required by~ 76-6-301, the robbery statute. 
"Intentionally" is defined in Utah Code Ann.,~ 76-2-103(1) 
-8-
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( 1953), as amend en, as: 
A person engages in conouct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or 
wilfully with respect to the nature of his 
connuct or to a result of his conduct, 
when it is his conscious ohiective or 
desire to enqage in the conduct or cause 
the result. 
See also: Jury Instruction ~o. 2q (T. ~9). Theft, however, 
requires that the taking he with the "purpose to deprive," 
which is defined in Utah Code Ann.,~ 76-fi-401(3) (1953), as 
amerrl ed, as: 
(e) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the 
conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or 
for so extended a period or to use under 
such circumstances that a substantial 
portion of its economic value, or of the 
use and benefit thereof, would be lost: or 
Ch) To restore the properly only upon 
payment of a reward or other compensation 
[this subsection was not included in the 
Jury Instructions in this case] : or 
(c) To dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that 
the owner will recover it. 
See also: Jury Instruction No. 25 at p. 7 above. The 
"purpose to deprive" is a culpahle mental state required as an 
essential element of the crime of theft which is by definition 
more specific than the intentional, knowing or reckless mental 
state generally required by the Criminal Code. State v. 
Laine, supra. It is an element of theft which is required in 
-9-
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addition to proof that the person acted intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly (See Jury Instruction No. 32, T. Q3). 
The "purpose to deprive" is not, however, an element of 
aggravated robbery, and it is not "embraced within the legal 
definition thereof." State v. Sunter, Utah, 550 P.2d 184, l8S 
(1976). Thus, theft cannot be a lesser included offense of 
robbery. 
The trial court noted an additional distinction 
which is pertinent to th is case : 
THE COURT: • • • [Tl he court finds that 
the offenses of theft and aqgravaterl 
robbery are separate of fen~es as defined 
by the legislature in the statutes of the 
State of TJtah. And I want to make it 
clear that I am being asked to find that 
theft is a lesser included not of robbery, 
but of agqravated robbery, because I think 
that is an important distinction (T. 199). 
The distinction between robbery and aggravated robbery 
referred to in the foregoing excerpt takes its importance from 
the fact that an intentional taking of personal property in 
the possession of another need not be provea for aggravated 
robbery (see the trial court's comments at T. lq~, line 27 
through T. 196, line 1). This is because, for the purposes of 
~ 76-6-302, the completed act of robbery is not required: an 
a tternpt to commit robbery is sufficient. Section 76-6-302 
states in pertinent part: 
-in-
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(1) A person commits aqgravatea robbery if 
in the course of committing a robbery, he: 
. . . 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act 
shall be deemed to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit, during the commission 
of, or in the immediate flight after the 
attempt or commission of the robbery 
(Emphasis addea). 
Under Utah Code Ann., ~ 76-4-101(1) (1953), as amended, a 
person is guilty of an attempt if: 
••• [Alcting with the kind of culpability 
otherwise required for the commission of 
the offense , he eng aqes in conduct 
constituting a substantial step toward 
commission of the offense • 
. Thus, while an "unlawful and intentional taking ••. " is 
required for robbery, under the attempt theory provided in the 
aggravated robbery statute, no actual taking of property need 
be proven to make out aqgravate~ robhery. Theft does require a 
taking, specifically that the person "obtain or exercise 
control • with the purpose to deprive," and therefore 
requires an element which is not requirea for agqravated 
robbery when aggravated robbery is proved through the use of 
the attempt theory. The result is that theft is not 
necessarily and always a lesser included offense of aggravated 
robbery. In State v. Williams, supra, at 1()96, (1981), this 
Court adoptea the following lanquage from People v. Escarcega, 
43 Cal. App. 391, 117 Cal. Rptr. c;gs ( 1Cl74): 
-11-
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It is of no consequence that the evidence 
at trial might also establish guilt of 
another and lesser crime than that 
charged. As indicated, to constitute a 
"lesser and necessaril~ included offense" 
it must be of such a nature that as a 
matter of law and considered in the 
abstract, the greater criMe as defineo by 
statute or charged in the accusatory 
pleading "cannot be committed without 
necessarily committing [such otherl 
offense." This rule has heen constantly 
reiterated. • • • The lesser offense must 
"necessarily and at all times [be] 
included wiihin another one." • • • "If, 
in the commission of acts Made unlawful by 
one statute, the offender must always 
violate another, the one offense [i.e., 
the latter] is necessarily included in the 
other" [Citations omitted; emphasis and 
bracketed language in original]. 
See also: State v. Gandee, supra. Because it is possible to 
commit aggravated robbery without also committing theft, theft 
is not a lesser includen offense of aqgravated robbery. Thus, 
appellant was properly charged and convicted of both theft ana 
aggravated robbery. 
POINT II 
Ar.GRAVATED ASSATJLT IS NOT A LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF' AGGRAVATF:D ROBRERY AS 
THOSE CRIMES WF:RE C:R..ARGEn IN THIS CASE. 
Appellant makes the statement on page 10 of his 
brief that: 
-12-
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••• the charqe of the lesser includea 
offense of agqravated assault should have 
been dropped and only the aqgr ava ted 
robbery charge should have been pursued. 
If this is an argument additional to his contention that theft 
is a lesser included offense of aqgravated robbery, the 
argument fails because appellant was charged and convicted of 
the aggravated robhery of Richard SalaMone, hut was charged 
and convicted of the aggravated assault of a different victim, 
John w. Savage. Counts II and IV of Jury Instruction No. 1 
verify this (T. 63-64). Because the counts pertain to 
different victims, neither crime alleged therein can be a 
lesser included offense of the other. 
CONCLUSI0N 
Rased upon the foregoing, respondent respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the conviction of the lower 
court. 
1983. 
Respectfully submitted this ~ day of March, 
DA'7!D L. WILKINSON 
A;;;;::t.l~ 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
-13-
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CERTIFICATR OF MAILINn 
I hereby certify that I mailed three true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Brooke c. 
Wells, Attorney for Appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Assoc., 333 south 2no Rast, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this 
Jl) day of March, 1981. 
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